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WHAT'S EVIL IN IRAQ? 
Joyce N. Wiley 
University of South Carolina Spartanburg 
Iraq has been declared "evil," an appellation that fits 
the Iraqi government well. The Ba 'thist government has 
held its own people in a reign of terror for more than 
three decades , torturing, murdering, and exiling hun-
dreds of thousands of them. ft has used chemical weapons 
of mass destruction (wmd) on them and made them par-
ties to war. The consequences of these policies are also 
appropriately labeled evil: debt, disease, fear, and inter-
national opprobrium. Some of the prescriptions for deal-
ing with the Iraqi government would benefit the long-
suffering Iraqi people; others would hurt them more . The 
best prescription is one that does not further "oppress 
the weak." 
American belief that Iraq might supply weapons of mass destruction (wmd) to terrorists targeting the United States got Iraq included in President Bush's "axis of 
evil." The Iraqi government actually used chemical wmd to kill 
tens of thousands of Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-1988), and it has used chemical weapons against Iraqi re-
bels a number of times-against Iraqi Shi'as in the country's 
southern marshes in June 1987, against guerrilla forces at Haj 
Umran in northern Iraq in November 1987, and against Iraqi 
Kurdish civilians in Halabja in 1988. In addition to the chemical 
wmd it has used, the Iraqi government possesses biological wmd 
and has tried to develop nuclear weapons. 
Evil is not a scientific term, to be precisely defined, but it is 
understood to mean morally bad, pernicious, or highly injurious 
and destructive. All of these words apply to the vise in which the 
Iraqi government holds its people. The 22 million Iraqi people 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
VOLUME 30 2002 PAGES 71-88 
72 WILEY 
have endured a reign of terror for decades. Besides wmd, the 
evils visited on them include torture, murder, pervasive fear, and 
in the last decade, undernutrition. Since the Gulf War (1990-
1991) the government has completely abandoned its responsibili-
ties to its people, committing all its available resources to recon-
structing its military and enriching the country's small elite. 
The Iraqi people who have been the targets of these gross 
abuses are divided religiously between Arab Shi'as, who are 
around 60% of the population, and Sunni Muslims, who consti-
tute about 37%. The Sunnis are divided ethnically, with Sunni 
Kurds being some 20% of the population, and Sunni Arabs, the 
politically dominant group, being the other 17%. The remaining 
3% are Arab Christians, Turkish Sunnis, and other minorities. 
The population of south and central Iraq, including Baghdad, is 
mainly Shi' a. Kurds predominate in three northern provinces, 
and Arab Sunnis are the majority group in the north central part 
of the country. 
This paper gives a brief historical account of the policies of 
the present Iraqi government and specifies the consequences of 




Iraq's first Ba'th government came to power in a military 
coup in February 1963. It stayed for nine months filled with 
"communist" hunting and executions without trial. Saddam Hus-
sein, a minimally educated young man in his twenties, was a 
Ba'th Party torturer at that time. The bloodletting turned both 
public and army against the government, leading Arab national-
ists in the army to seize power in November. Nearly five years of 
relatively benign military government followed. 
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In 1968 the Ba'thists returned to power in another coup. This 
time Saddam appeared as vice-president of the country, having 
risen meteorically within the party despite spending part of the 
intervening period in prison and part in Egyptian coffee houses. 
Although his kinsman General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr was presi-
dent, Saddam was from the beginning the one people feared. Us-
ing an 'internal enemies' strategy reminiscent of Hitler, the new 
government proceeded to target first one group and then another. 
Just as Hitler purged in tum communists and Gypsies and Jews 
and Catholics, so Iraq's Ba'thist government announced one con-
spiracy after another, each time proceeding to purge the accused 
group-'Iranians' (read Shi'as), Kurds, communists, and 
Islamists. Each community was targeted repeatedly, so that there 
was always some 'enemy' on whom attention could be focused. 
When the 1973 oil embargo drove up oil prices, Iraqi gov-
ernment coffers overflowed because Iraq was the one Arab oil 
producer that did not participate in the embargo. The bonanza 
was used to expand and upgrade the government's security 
forces. Sophisticated equipment for surveillance and "interroga-
tion" enabled the various secret police organizations to spy on 
each other, as well as on the public, and to terrify the entire 
population. The government's repressive ability was augmented 
and exercised. Some 200,000 Kurds were relocated away from 
the mountains that had been their homeland for centuries . Thou-
sands of Iraqi Shi'as were expelled to Iran. Political opposition 
to the government became suicidal. 
In 1979 Saddam assumed the presidency and promptly 
purged the Ba ' th Party itself, probably including his kinsman, 
ex-president al-Bakr, who 'died' mysteriously. An enormous 
number of Iraqis were arrested and tortured, many dying in 
prison. Tens of thousands of Shi' as were expelled from the coun-
try, some of them forced to traverse the mountains on foot to get 
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to Iran, which took them in, despite the fact that many of them 
did not speak Iranian and had no assets. 
In 1980, after executing Shi'a leaders who could have rallied 
opposition to a government-initiated war, Saddam invaded Iran. 
The government dealt successfully with the inclination of Shi'a 
conscripts to desert by executing family members of soldiers 
who did. Even so, the government avoided defeat in the eight-
year war only through help from the U.S., which provided Iraq 
with American intelligence data on Iranian forces, sold Iraq heli-
copter gunships and other quality military equipment , and took a 
number of steps to weaken Iran . 
When the war was finally over in 1988, Saddam carried out 
his Anfal campaign , killing from 50,000 to 180,000 Kurds ac-
cording to the Iraq Liberation Act passed by Congress in 1998. 
The government also purged up to 800 army officers, many of 
them Shi ' a. 
Facing serious financial problems due to the long war with 
Iran, the Iraqi government opted in 1990 for another war, this 
time against its wealthy but weak neighbor to the south, Kuwait. 
The gold in Kuwaiti vaults and the oil in Kuwaiti soil would 
have solved Iraq 's money problems, but this invasion did not get 
the Western support that the 1980 invasion of Iran did . Instead, 
the UN placed Iraq under an economic embargo in August 1990. 
United Nations Resolution 661 imposed comprehensive sanc-
tions on "all commodities and products originating in Iraq ... " 
and on "[T]he sale ... of any commodities or products ... to any 
person or body in Iraq .. . " (Sifry and Cerf 1991, 138-139). US-
led international forces were built up in the area and a five-week 
war, which featured heavy bombing of Iraq, fo11owed. Saddam's 
reluctant peasant conscr ipts were no match for an industrial-
world army, and Kuwait was soon freed from Iraq's control. 
As Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait , some of them sponta-
neously turned their weapons on the omnipresent statues of Sad-
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dam. The civilian population of southern Iraq quickly joined in, 
attacking senior members of the Ba 'th Party and party symbols. 
Thus began the March 1991 intifada. Junior members of the 
Ba'th Party joined the rebels, but the rebellion in the south was 
handicapped by having no leader(s). Some of the rebels raised 
banners to senior Shi'a clerics, men who were very elderly, not 
present, and in no position to lead a rebellion, even if they were 
inclined to do so. This lack of leadership, coupled with the de-
feated government's ability to use helicopter gunships to attack 
the rebels, enabled the Republican Guard to end the revolt with a 
bloodbath. Mass arrests and executions followed the end of the 
fighting in the south. 
A few days after the rebellion in the south, the Kurds of 
northern Iraq also rose against the government. The Kurds' rebel-
lion was led by tribal chiefs who had previously collaborated 
with the Iraqi government (Kubba 2001, 74) and turned out bet-
ter for the Kurds than the rebellion in the south did for the Shi'a. 
In the north, international pressure forced the withdrawal of the 
Iraqi army and led to the establishment of an American-led no-
fly zone within which the Iraqi government was not allowed to 
use aircraft, including helicopter gunships. Thus the Kurds 
gained autonomy in northern Iraq. 
Although the Gulf War was over, economic sanctions against 
Iraq were left in place. In addition, UN Resolution 687 of April 
1991, sponsored by the US, required the destruction of Iraq's 
chemical and biological weapons and stipulated that no arms 
could be sold to Iraq. The resolution eased controls on the import 
of food and medicine, but not on the consumer goods and mate-
rials needed to rebuild the country's devastated infrastructure. 
Beginning in 1996 some oil export was allowed in an oil-for-
food program. Under the program, oil is sold and the proceeds 
go into a UN-controlled account, of which Iraq gets a share. The 
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Iraqi government can purchase food and some other civilian 
items with its part of the revenues. 
The sanctions remain the tightest the world has imposed in 
modem history. Considerable leakage has appeared in the last 
few years, but the revenues from the smuggled oil benefit the 
government , not the public. That the Iraqi government would 
evade and defy the international sanctions was assured, given its 
past behavior. From their very accession to power, the Ba 'thists 
have relied on force. To maintain themselves in power after hurt-
ing so many of their own people , they need weapons . The gov-
ernment probably also feels a need for weapons to protect itself 
against the myriad of enemies it has in the region , some of 
whom, Iran and Kuwait for example, were made enemies by the 
government's own actions. 
Evil Consequences 
Whether one looks at the economic, social, political, or reli-
gious area, the consequences of the Iraqi government's policies 
merit the designation "evil." The sanctions are devastating the 
country, but the international community has been unwilling to 
remove them as long as Saddam is in power, and he is not about 
to help the Iraqi people by leaving voluntarily. This is no sur-
prise, given his past record and the penchant of all governments 
to stay in power. Even so, much of the blame for the destitution 
and agony of the Iraqi people lies with him. 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
The country 's debt is astronomical. The UN Compensation 
Commission reports that 100 countries have lodged claims 
against Iraq and that claims for financial losses related to the in-
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vasion of Kuwait are $300 billion. 1 Government debts from the 
Iran-Iraq War also wait to be paid. 
The bombing damage done in 1990 and 1991 has not been 
repaired in much of south and central Iraq. School buildings are 
unfit for use. Schools that are operating lack books and supplies. 
Teacher training is non-existent. Literacy has declined from 90% 
to 66% since 1990 (Garfield 2000, 18). The world's advances in 
technology and science are unstudied. 
During the eleven years of international sanctions on Iraq, a 
UN panel called Committee 661, named after the 1990 Security 
Council resolution that instituted the sanctions, has determined 
what can or cannot enter Iraq. Anything that might have a mili-
tary purpose, e.g. lead pencils, stethoscopes, pesticides, and 
spare parts for the water, sanitation, and electricity systems, is 
put on hold. The economy is utterly ruined, with virtually noth-
ing being produced. Even agriculture, sorely needed to feed peo-
ple, lacks vital machinery. The currency has collapsed. The 
average Iraqi's monthly income dropped to between $2 and $5. 
Prices, however, remain very high, e.g. airfare and the "departure 
tax" for a trip to Jordan was $500 in 2000.2 Iraq used to have a 
substantial middle class. Now everyone except the small gov-
ernment elite has been reduced to poverty. Educated people who 
can emigrate have done so. 
In 2002 some improvement occurred as the government 
raised salaries, increased hospital supplies, and extended the 
hours when electricity is available. Presumably the government 
could have taken these steps earlier, but did so in 2002 in order 
to generate some public support in anticipation of a US attack. 
' Middle East International, 29 September 2000, p.21. 
2 Middle East International 26 January 2001, p. 20. 
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Social Consequences 
Under the UN oil-for-food program Iraq is allowed about 37 
cents a day per capita for nutrition, medicine and other needs. 3 
The food products purchased and distributed are low in protein 
and the ration lasts only about half of the month, but it does help 
the regime keep track of people (Graham-Brown 1997, 36). As 
for medicines and hospital supplies, the government actually 
buys fewer health supplies than the U.N has allocated. The UN 
official responsible for monitoring Iraqi applications for imports 
under the oil-for-food program has stated that in a six-month pe-
riod "the value of applications for supplies Iraq submitted in the 
health sector was only $83.6 million, whereas $624 million had 
been allocated." 4 According to UNICEF, the mortality rate for 
Iraqi children under five has increased by 160%, compared to 
1990.5 Malnutrition and waterborne diseases caused by the de-
struction of the country's water, sanitation, and electrical infra-
structure during the Gulf War continue to kill thousands every 
month. Many of the children who live are dwarfed by malnutri-
tion. 
In southern Iraq, the area heavily bombed during the Gulf 
War, the rate of leukemia and other cancers, as well as birth de-
formities, has been so high since 1991 that UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in January 2001 ordered an inquiry into the 
effect of the depleted uranium armaments dropped there during 
the GulfWar. 6 Saddam's wmd attacks caused a high incidence of 
3 San Francisco Chronicle, 14 February 2002 . 
4 Munro, Alan. 2001. "Iraq and Sanctions 10 Years On." Middle East International, 29 
September, pp . 24-26 . · 
' Middle East International, 21 December 2001 , p. 28. 
6 Middle East International, 26 January 2001, p. 7. 
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birth defects, cancers, respiratory problems, and infertility 
among the survivors of Halabja and may be the cause of some of 
the similar problems among the Shi'as of southern Iraq. 
Political Consequences 
The government's policies have resulted in a major loss of 
Iraqi territory. Control of northern Iraq was lost in 1991 as a re-
sult of the international requirement that the Iraqi army withdraw 
from Kurdish territory. A small amount of very important terri-
tory was lost in the south when UN Security Council Resolution 
833 of 1994 reduced Iraq's access to the sea by drawing a new 
border in Kuwait's favor. 
Human rights in Iraq could hardly have gotten worse than 
they were, but the government has carried out genocide in the 
south against the Shi'a Ma'dan, turning the marshes that were 
their livelihood into desert to punish them for helping the 1991 
rebels. Arrests and torture of all Iraqis continue apace. Informers 
and secret police are everywhere. Debilitated by fear, depression 
and disease, much of the population is immobilized. 
The tell-tale beards of salafi Muslims, rarely seen in Iraq in 
the past, have appeared among individual young Sunnis in 
Baghdad and in a group of up to 700 in the Kurdish autonomous 
region.7 The salafis are Sunni fundamentalists, possibly al-Qaeda 
and definitely anti-Shi'a. The group in Kurdistan, called Ansar 
al-Islam (Helpers of Islam), includes Kurds, Iraqi Arabs, Jorda-
nians, Afghans, Moroccans, and Palestinians. They have mur-
dered women for refusing to wear the veil and they have been 
targeting Kurdish leaders, presumably to decapitate Kurdish 
military forces that might join in an effort to overthrow the Iraqi 
government.8 The group reportedly has ties to al-Qaeda and very 
7 Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 2002 . 
8 One recalls that the Afghan leader, Ahmad Massoud , was assassinated 9/9/0 I, just be-
fore the 9/ 11 attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. 
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likely has connections to Saddam's secret police. Sponsorship of 
a religious group would be a departure for Saddam, who was 
known for being anti-religious until he adopted a religious per-
sona in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War, a change Iraqis dismiss 
as equivalent to a jailhouse conversion. If Saddam is sponsoring 
these salafi Muslims , religious motivation can surely be ruled 
out. 
International policies have also had some negative conse-
quences. Sanctions have undermined the urban middle class 
(Kubba 2001, 69), the class that has always been the strongest 
supporter for a unified Iraq. Deaths from American and British 
air strikes during their patrol of the southern no-fly zone kill 100 
or so per year. Such deaths amounted to 353 in the three-year 
period from 1998 to 2001. 9 The bombing is usually aimed at de-
grading Iraq's air defense system, but bombs and missiles kill 
people as well as radar systems. 
Religious Consequences 
The Iraqi clergy, both Shi'a and Sunni, are so weakened they 
are almost unable to minister to their people (Wiley 2001 ). The 
government has usurped their functions, dictated the subjects of 
their sermons, and stolen their financial assets. The Sunni Arab 
clergy are state employees working under a degree of govern-
ment control that has turned pious and capable young Sunni men 
away from religious vocations. 
The Shi'a clergy have managed to maintain some independ-
ence of the government but are sorely debilitated in number by 
government assassinations, arrests and forced exile. Many of 
their mosques have been closed. Their senior cleric is under 
house arrest, and they are no longer able to conduct religious 
education. On the other hand, many Iraqis have become more 
9 Middle East International , 31 August 200 I , p. 18. 
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religious, probably attributable to the fact that people turn to re-
ligion in times of crisis . Thus the Shi'a shrines in south central 
Iraq have experienced their largest crowds ever in recent years. 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH 
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT 
Most of the Iraqi people fervently desire to be relieved of 
their oppression, but they fear the death and destruction that 
could be part of the process. What that process might be is under 
discussion. The proposals being considered are as follows. 
Change in the Sanctions Regime 
Economic sanctions have not accomplished their goal of 
weakening Saddam. There is widespread agreement internation-
ally that the sanctions hurt the people of Iraq, not Saddam. In 
fact, the sanctions actually benefit Saddam in a number of ways, 
not the least of which is giving him a ready excuse for the coun-
try's ills. Sanctions enable him to blame the lack of food and af-
fordable medicine on the United States and to blame his pursuit 
of armaments on the necessity of defense against Iraq's obvious 
enemies. The government is able to circumvent the sanctions by 
illegally transporting oil via trucks to Turkey and Jordan, through 
Iranian waters, and more recently via a pipeline to Syria. The 
illegal revenues are then used for military purposes. 
A "smarter" system of sanctions was adopted at the end of 
May 2002, but it is not likely to improve the situation greatly. It 
retains a "goods review list" that can be used to delay dual use 
items, and it does not increase the country's revenues in any way. 
Most of the people who are dying are dying of bad water, which 
will not be affected by the new sanctions regime. The changes 
suggested by people like Sir Alan Munro, former British Ambas-
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sador to Saudi Arabia, would have redirected restraints to spe-
cifically military items and away from civilian goods 10 (Munro, 
26), thus making it possible to repair the water and sewage sys-
tems. 
Building a Legal Case against Saddam 
It is commonly believed in Iraq that the United States wanted 
Saddam in power and wants the Iraqi people debilitated or it 
would not have left him in power and the sanctions in place at 
the end of the Gulf War. Saddam used to, and may still, tell his 
secondary elite that he has a special relationship with the United 
States . (The US did help him a lot in the Iran-Iraq War.) Iraqis 
and others could be disabused of this belief if the United States 
were. to build a public, legal case against Saddam, thereby attest-
ing that the goal is to get rid of him, not to cripple the Iraqi peo-
ple. The US Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes, Pierre-Richard 
Prosper, has told Congress he is developing data on Saddam's 
atrocities, and Representative Tom Lantos (Dem., CA) has sug-
gested an international war crimes tribunal for Iraq. Saddam 
could certainly be charged with a wide variety of crimes against 
humanity, genocide against the Kurds for example. Such a step 
would encourage the defection of Iraqi soldiers when the mili-
tary phase of removing Saddam begins. 
Coup in the Inner Circle 
A coup in Saddam's inner circle has been the favored option 
of some in the US government, the rationale being that this 
would get rid of Saddam without the danger of destabilizing the 
country. Indeed, not much would change under this scenario. 
Essentially Iraq would get one compromised tyrant in place of 
10 Alan Munro, "Iraq and Sanctions JO Years On," Middle East International, 29 Sep-
tember 2001, p. 26. 
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another, given that people in Saddam's inner circle are just about 
as evil as he is. The new dictator would have to rely on force to 
stay in power so human rights in Iraq would not likely improve 
significantly. Fortunately or unfortunately, such a coup has not 
been possible to effect. 
Military Coup 
A variation on the inner circle coup would be a military coup 
by a group of younger, less tainted officers, perhaps with some 
US assistance. This type of coup has actually been tried a num-
ber of times , but most of the officers have been executed even 
before the coup day arrives , presumably because of the govern-
ment's ubiquitous secret police and informer system. 
This scenario continues to have appeal to Arab countries like 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia because it would maintain Arab Sunni 
dominance in Iraq, given that nearly all the army officers are 
Arab Sunnis. It reportedly appeals to many in Iraq's Arab Sunni 
community who fear that a payback mentality could take hold in 
the other communities if Arab Sunnis lose control the country. 
The problem with this scenario is that rule continues to be by 
a minority, and minority rule has to be imposed. To be stable and 
accepted, a replacement government will have to be much more 
representative than past governments have been. Neither the 
Shi'as nor the Kurds, about 80% of the population, can be ex-
pected to embrace this option. 
Afghanistan Model of US Air Attack Followed by Ground 
Troops 
The Afghan model of a US bombing campaign, followed by a 
ground operation conducted by indigenous forces or by US 
troops has been considered. It is highly likely that the country's 
conscript army would rapidly surrender to an indigenous force-
probably even to a foreign force; but there are a number of prob-
lems with the scenario. Firstly, Iraq is already prostrate, posing 
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ethical and practical considerations regarding its further destruc-
tion through a bombing campaign. Muslim countries and proba-
bly other countries as well are adamantly opposed to further 
victimizing Iraqi victims with a bombing campaign in which 
many innocent people would be killed and injured . Secondly, 
pro-American Arab governments like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
Jordan might be unable to control their own people during such 
an attack , for Arab sympathy is very much with the Iraqi people. 
Thirdly, as Senator Chuck Hagel (Rep., NE) has warned, a mili-
tary strike on Iraq could break it up and make it more danger-
ous.11 Fourthly, Iraq might be able to inflict some damage on the 
attackers. In August 2001, it finally succeeded, after years of try-
ing, in downing one of the US planes that enforce the no-fly 
zone in Iraq. The plane was a drone so no one was hurt, but the 
incident does indicate that Saddam's spending of all the coun-
try's resources on rearmament has had some payoff. 
Another problem is who would play the role the Northern Al-
liance played in Afghanistan, i.e. who would be the ground 
troops in Iraq. Neither of the organized groups, the Shi' a gueril-
las in the south and the Kurds in the north , can be expected to 
fight for another Sunni Arab dictatorship. The Kurds now have 
substantial autonomy, which could be diminished or worse when 
a new government comes to power. They can hardly be expected 
to go up against the Iraqi army in a fight that could worsen their 
situation . The Kurds have three times responded to US blan-
dishments and risen against the Iraqi government (the early 
1970s, 1991, and 1996), only to be left to Saddam's 'mercies' 
when the US withheld support while Saddam used his army 
against them. Before they take on Saddam again, they want as-
surance they will not be abandoned . In the words of the leader of 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan , "Tomorrow if America comes 
11 f!ew York Times, 17 February 2002 . 
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with a real guarantee, we will trust. If they come with only 
words, we will not." 12 
This option also has the problem that the military coup option 
has. Who would be the replacement government? The US is re-
portedly considering several Sunni Arab generals for the posi-
tion. Any of them would leave Iraq with an imposed, minority 
government. 
Broad-Based Insurgency Supported by a US No-Fly Zone 
This is the scenario that would most likely lead to self-
determination for the Iraqi people. The insurgents would be a 
joint force of Kurds in the north and troops of the Supreme 
Command for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in the 
south. The US would aid the rebels by enforcing a no-fly zone 
over the whole country, thereby preventing Saddam from using 
the wmd he has used so successfully against rebels in the past. 
Disaffected army units are expected to join in, as they did at the 
end of the Gulf War. Already the army is experiencing attrition. 
As of April 2002 as many as one-fourth of the 400,000 strong 
army were missing from their posts according to The Observer 
of April 28, 2002. 13 The strength of the army is estimated at less 
than half what it was ten years ago, and defectors estimate that 
up to 85% of those remaining would surrender.14 
The Shi' a fighting force would be led by SCIRI, which has 
waged a low-level guerrilla war in the south under the leadership 
of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. Tribal Shi'as would 
likely join the effort in the south as soon as the fighting started 
for the al-Hakim name has credibility with tribal Shi'as. The 
Shi'a rebels do not want a wide bombing campaign for they 
12 Christian Science Mo.-.itor, 9 April 2002 . 
13 Accessed at www.guardian .co .uk. 
14 Christian Science Monitor, 25 March 2002 . 
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know they would be discredited by association with a devastat-
ing US bombing operation that would further damage their al-
ready prostrate country. The leader of SCIRI has said that Iraqis 
can free Iraq if the US enforces a no-fly zone throughout the 
country and prevents the regime from using its heavy weapons, 15 
a strategy the US used in Kosovo. 
The plan of democratic government sought by al-Hakim and 
his supporters has been known for several decades (Wiley 1992, 
125-127). Al-Hakim has consistently supported the idea of de-
mocracy in Iraq, and did so again in the Christian Science Moni-
tor interview cited above. The governmental system sought by 
the reformist Shi'as al-Hakim leads has an elected parliament 
and an elected executive . The Supreme Court would be ap-
pointed and would consist of Islamic clerics. The court 's precise 
composition has been left to negotiation with other Iraqi groups, 
but there is private acknowledgement that it would include Sun-
nis and Shi' as, Arabs and Kurds, just as the parliament would. 
The two Kurdish groups could be encouraged to join in by the 
promise of two or three Kurdish provinces in a new federal, de-
mocratic Iraq. Many of the Kurds are inclined toward democ-
racy. The section of Kurdistan controlled by the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan has long had more freedom than other parts of Iraq. 
The creation of more than one Kurdish province within a unified 
Iraq might be tolerable to the Turks, who are strongly opposed to 
an independent Kurdistan. 
CONCLUSION 
Saddam Hussein is a terrorist who is responsible for the 
deaths of some one million Iranians, Iraqis, and Kuwaitis . He is 
evil, and ridding Iraq and the world of him is highly desirable. A 
15 Christian Science Monitor , 14 ·February 2002. 
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major consideration protecting Saddam in the past was the fear 
that deposing him could destabilize Iraq, but now that he has 
been identified as a potential threat to the United States, the "sta-
bility" of his horrific police state may be coming to an end. 
In the Code of Hammurabi, one of Iraq's early rulers, Ham-
murabi (ruled 1792 to 1750 B.C.) declared that "the strong may 
not oppress the weak."16 The Iraqi people are very weak, but 
they are not evil. They have been the government's chief victims 
and have tried repeatedly to oust Saddam-just as President 
Bush the first and President Clinton did. No strategy for ridding 
the world of Iraq's evil government comes with a guaranteed 
outcome, but some strategies have better prospects than others. It 
is herein contended that the policy that has morality on its side 
and would be well received in Iraq and most other countries 
would involve: (1) building a public legal case against Saddam; 
(2) enforcing a no-fly zone over all Iraq; and (3) working with 
indigenous forces favorable to democracy, namely Shi' as, Kurds, 
and willing Arab Sunnis. 
REFERENCES 
Garfield, Richard. 2000. "The Public Health Impact of Sanctions ." 
Middle East Report . 215: 16-19. 
Graham-Brown, Sarah. 1997. "War and Sanctions: Cost to Society and 
Toll on Development," in The Future of Iraq, John Calabrese, 
ed. Washington: Middle East Institute. 31-42. 
Kubba, Laith. 2001. "Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq." In 
Iran , Iraq , and the Arab Gulf States , Joseph Kechichian, ed. 
NY: Palgrave. 65-82. 
16 Sawyer, Jon . "Stories of Privation, Signs of Improvement," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 26 
May 2002 . 
VOL . 30 2002 
88 WILEY 
Si fry, Micah L. and Christopher Cerf, eds . 1991 . The Gulf War Reader : 
History, Documents, Opinions . New York: Random House. 
Wiley, Joyce N . 1992. The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi 'as. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner . 
__ . 2001. "The Position of the Iraqi Clergy," in Iran, Iraq, and the 
Arab Gulf States. Joseph Kechichian, ed . NY: Palgrave. 55-63. 
www.guardian.co.uk 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
